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Pigou's theory of business cycle as an inquiry into
unemployment:
on the relative e®ects of the gold standard and the wage
rigidity in the twenties
Norikazu TAKAMIy
In this paper I examine A. C. Pigou's views on the unemployment policies, based on the
premise that, as he himself acknowledged, his theory of business °uctuations was one integral
part of his whole thought about unemployment. In his Industrial Fluctuations (1927), Pigou
gave the most extensive treatment to the monetary policy among the measures against business
°uctuations. There he advocated more prompt and smooth action by the Bank of England in
order to e®ectively stabilize the movement of general prices and the economy as a whole. In
order for its action not to be a®ected by external monetary shocks, he suggested the withdrawal
from the gold standard should the public opinion and international diplomatic relations allow
it. Pigou, meanwhile, placed much less importance on wage adjustment as a palliative against
business cycle.
The recent studies direct attention to the fact that Pigou pointed out that after World War
I money wages were made rigid by such factors as contemporary institutional changes in labor
markets. This picture, however, lacks a more important element of his thought: the monetary
cause due to the gold standard on the prewar parity. Putting his indirect remarks on this
in°uence together, I argue that Pigou was well aware of the monetary situation and seemed
to place greater importance on the monetary in°uence than the wage rigidity.
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1 Introduction
Keynes condemned Pigou in General Theory so un°inchingly and de¯nitively that Pigou
had been seen for long as proposing in Theory of Unemployment (1933) the overall wage cut
as an ameliorative policy against unemployment. Hutchison (1978) and Aslanbeigui (1989),
however, showed their oppositions against this view, pointing to the fact that Pigou proposed
re°ationary policies in the Times in the thirties. They demonstrated the agreement in the
policy proposal between Keynes and Pigou.1 But it is undoubtable that Pigou proposed
wage adjustment, not just as a theoretical consequence, but as a practical policy; and that
he continued to do so until the end of his career. Then how much weight did he place on
wage adjustment? How much more, or less, e®ective did he think wage adjustment was than
other ameliorative measures such as public works and monetary policy? In this paper we
will examine the relative importance Pigou attached to each measure based on his Industrial
Fluctuations (1927), which he himself noted was complementary to Theory of Unemployment ;
and conclude that wage adjustment, in his system, was a less e®ective measure.
Next we will be concerned with how Pigou applied this system of industrial °uctuations
to the British economy after World War I. As Laidler (1999, 159{60) already notices, Pigou
pointed to the postwar change that the average rate of wage had been made much more rigid
than it was before the war. It is true, as Laidler suggests, that Pigou found this change respon-
sible for the substantial part of the contemporary mass unemployment; but it is inadequate,
we argue, in grasping his thought on practical policy. Less explicit though it was than the
problem of wage rigidity, Pigou had left many indirect statements, as well, on the contempo-
rary signi¯cant fall in prices due to the ¯nxed exchange rate under the gold standard. Based
on these evidences I will argue that Pigou had a consistent analysis on the causes for mass
unemployment, putting more weight on the price fall rather than wage rigidity in spite of his
clear statement above.
Sections 2 and 3 presents respectively the analytical aspect and the remedial aspect of
Pigou's theory on business °uctuations. Section 4 examines the relation between the prob-
lem of wage rigidity in the twenties and the contemporary monetary disturbance in Pigou's
writings. Then I conclude that Pigou consistently recognized the importance of monetary
policy.
1 Ambrosi (2003), who points out the macro-theoretical di®erence between Keynes and Pigou, acknowl-
edges that Pigou supported re°ation (Ambrosi, 2003, 117{8).
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2 Causes of unemployment
Pigou's theory of business cycle originates out of the purpose to analyze unemployment, as
stated in the preface of his earlier book, Wealth and Welfare (1912).2 This purpose is kept in
Industrial Fluctuations (IF hereafter), too, the evidence of which is that Pigou uses the rate
of unemployment as the main barometer of business °uctuations.
First in IF, Pigou notices the broad tendency that the aggregate supply of labor adjusts itself
to the long-term movement of the aggregate demand for labor; and thereby de¯nes the direct
cause of the movement of unemployment (or business cycle) as \deviations in the movement
of the demand schedule away from its general line of trend" (Pigou, 1927a, 22). That is to
say, when the demand for labor is stable,
the wage-rate would settle down at the level required to give employment to the whole
available supply of able-bodied labour. It is only ecause demand °uctuates that con-
vention in wage-rates acts as it does: the rate is adapted to the conditions of normal
times. (Pigou, 1927a, 245)
To Pigou, who holds that the absence of the movement in demand for labor means the absence
of unemployment in the long run, the theory of business °uctuations subsumes the theory of
unemployment.
Pigou starts his analysis by relating the movement of demand for labor to the present value
of the anticipated yield entertained by businessmen (Pigou, 1927a, 26). The present value
depends on its numerator, the anticipated yield and its denominator, the rate of discounting.
The latter's changes come about, in the short run, only through the variation in the quantity
of money. Consequently, in the system of IF, direct causes of business °uctuations are reduced
to the following two: (1) the anticipated yield entertained by businessmen and (2) the quantity
of money.
Pigou divides the ¯rst cause of business °uctuations, the anticipated yield of businessmen
into two subdivisions. The ¯rst of them is \real causes", which consist in \changes that have
occurred, or are about to occur, in actual industrial conditions" (Pigou, 1927a, 35). Among
real causes are included changes in the yield of crops, inventions and improvement in the
method of production, discovery of mineral deposits, industrial disputes, wars, and foreign
business °uctuations (including changes in custom duties). The second of the subdivisions
is \psychological causes". Psychological causes consist in the \errors" necessarily involved in
the forecasts for future conditions, the existence of which enlarges the °uctuation beyond the
magnitude real causes account for. Pigou attributes the fact that a competitive economy is
liable to this error to the following reasons. First, industries highly organized, manufactures
carry less stock, while dealers undertake the o±ce of forecast; and the way is still widely
opened for the error.3 Second, it is practically impossible to extrude the general public from
stock exchange; and their lack of judgment or information causes disturbances. Third, the fact
that in a competitive economy independent agents make decisions on investment is a factor
to extend errors of forecast. Because each of the agents \usually pays too little attention to
2 \Several years ago I began to study the causes of unemployment. It soon became apparent, however,
that these causes are so closely interwoven with the general body of economic activity that an isolated
treatment of them is scarcely practicable" (Pigou, 1912, v).
3 Though Pigou doesn't mention this, the role of dealers is indispensable in the system of R. Hawtrey.
According to Hawtrey, it is through the stock held by dealers that the rate of interest or the movement
of prices a®ects the level of output and employment. See Howson (1985).
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the fact that his rivals are likely to have formed the same opinion and to be acting on it"
(Pigou, 1927a, 77). This circumstance makes di±cut the optimal intertemporal allocation of
productive factors. It is not practicable to devise \forward buying", or future trade on all kinds
of factors; nor is it possible for the single combined agent in a Trust or a Kartel to continually
perform business, in any case, because it will \presently break up again" (Pigou, 1927a, 81).
And fourth, while thus ¯rms and investors are independent of one another, they are vulnerable
to other agents' psychological states. Pigou takes notice of the possibility that a person may
be in°uenced by someone with whom he/she has no business or credit connection. \Perhaps
the buoyancy of a grocer", he quotes from one author, \gives a lumber dealer no adequate
reason for altering his conservative attitude towards the business projects upon which he must
pass. . . . The fundamental conditions a®ecting his own business may remain the same; but
his conduct is altered because he sees the old facts in a new emotional perspective." (Pigou,
1927a, 86).4 It is much more certain, however, for the psychological in°uence to spread among
buyers and sellers and debtors and creditors. Thus excessive optimism or pessimism would
easily spread itself around the business world. The substantial part of a business °uctuation,
he asserts, depends on psychological errors.
The second cause of business °uctuations is, as noted above, the variations in quantity of
money that a®ect the rate of discounting. In the latter half of the 1920s, \there were, in
all, some thirty countries whose currencies were legally or de facto based on gold" (Pigou,
1927a, 104); and, therefore, disturbances in the international gold market brought about
changes in quantity of money within each of these countries. Consequently, for instance, when
\between 1871 and 1873 Germany absorbed a large quantity of gold in order to establish a
gold standard and in the years following 1878 the United States did likewise in connection
with a law making the inconvertible Government bank notes, which had been issued during
the Civil War, convertible into gold at the Treasury" (Pigou, 1927a, 193), the general prices in
Britain fell. Thus between countries on the gold standard a simple fact of credit expansion in
any foreign country might be a factor to disturb the monetary situation in a domestic economy
through ¯xed exchange rate.
Money has not only the function of generating such autonomous changes, but also, Pigou
emphasizes, the function of expanding the °uctuations initiated by some causes. If the present
value of the anticipated yield of businessmen were improved by whatever causes, they can resort
to, except internal reserves or issuing of debentures, bank credits as a ¯nancial resource. In
the latter case, the aggregate quantity of money rises. Since it is likely that \income velocity
of monetary circulation" rises, the general prices is likely to rise, which brings about what
Pigou calls \forced levies".5 Through this process, businessmen can levy the real resources
from the general public more than the latter is willing to save. In addition, in the case of
rising prices the rates of wage and interest contracted in the past are changed into the rates in
real terms advantageous to businessmen, who are \in the main, borrowers and wage-payers"
(Pigou, 1927a, 137). \Forced levies" and \doctorings of the terms of past contracts" will
further the improvement of the anticipated yield through the psychological channel, resulting
in further rise of prices. Thus business improvement once started will continue to accelerate
itself; and \[u]ntil some external event, such as the refusal of bankers to create any more
credits, intervenes, there is no reason why this process should ever come to an end" (Pigou,
1927a, 172).
4 These sentences are quoted from Mitchell, Business Cycles, p. 455. In IF, Pigou relis on him in many
other places.
5 Laidler (1999, 89{90) says Pigou absorbed the idea of forced saving or forced levy, not from the Austrian
School, but from D. H. Robertson.
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What has been thus far discussed is concerned with the movement of demand for labor.
Pigou doesn't end his explanation here, but places some importance on wage adjustment
between employers and employees. The reason why he does so is that he thinks di®erent kinds
of labor are more likely to be complementary than to be substitutive to each other.
Suppose that ten groups of workpeople in ten occupations contribute in about equal pro-
portions towards making some ¯nished commodity. Suppose, further, that the elasticity
of demand for the ¯nished commodity is unity . . . Then a 10 per cent cut in the wages
of one of the occupations will involve a 1 per cent fall in the price of the commodity
and also a 1 per cent increase in the quantity of labour demanded in that occupation.
But it will also involve a 1 per cent increase in the quantity of labour demanded in
each of the other occupations. Hence, although, if a single group accepts a 10 per cent
wage-cut, employment in that group will expand only 1 per cent, should all the groups
accept a 10 per cent wage-cut employment in all the groups collectively will expand 10
per cent. . . . As regards industries which are not joint contributors to a common work,
if the mutual demand for one another's products has an elasticity greater than unity, a
reduction of costs in one will stimulate output in the others. (Pigou, 1927a, 201{2)
Based on this general-equilibrium reasoning, Pigou rebuts \popular arguments" whose sights
are too small to correctly estimate the evil e®ects of wage rigidity. Flexibility or rigidity of
wage-rates, Pigou concludes, has greater e®ects than they suggests. Yet he assumes that in real
life the mutual distrust between employers and employees, as will be discussed below, prevents
wage adjustment from being °exible, which generates more large movement of unemployment
than can practically be reduced.
To sum up, Pigou's system of business °uctuations can be characterized by its simplicity
and °exibility. The channels through which to bring about changes in demand for labor are
distinguished into (1) real, (2) psychological, and (3) monetary ones; the impulses of these
di®erent channels a®ect one another so as to create the further e®ects continually. Further-
more, the movement of demand for labor thus brought about is hardly ameliorated by wage
rigidity. Analyzing the causes of business °uctuations in this manner, Pigou passes on to the
examination on remedies by which to minimize the °uctuations. The methods to which he
directs attention are monetary policies, public works, and wage adjustment.
3 Remedies to business °uctuations
Pigou recognizes the social losses due to unemployment (Pigou, 1927a, 241{7). Unemploy-
ment is diminution of incomes \concentrated on the unfortunate few" and also deteriorates
psychological as well as physical capabilities of workers. Besides, the fear of unemployment
begets a \haunting sense of insecurity and danger" even to the mind of currently employed
workers. Meanwhile, excessive prosperity that lies on the other end of business cycle is not
a propitious condition to workers. Because \when, as often happens, the fat months imply
long hours of overtime, they will not yield any good e®ects to set against the evil e®ects of
the lean months, but will themselves add further evil e®ects". For Pigou, to stabilize business
°uctuations means the \relief [of workpeople] from the distresses of unemployment and the
strain of booms".6 Thus it is with the aim of improving the predicaments of workers that
Pigou discusses the following remedies.
6 Keynes's rhetorical imperative in the General Theory to the e®ect that we should aim at a constant
boom might have been directed against such an orthodox view as Pigou's that we should restrict a boom
as well as a slump. See Keynes (1936, 322{7).
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3.1 Monetary policy
Keynes's assertion that Pigou relies too much on real analysis might be valid when concerned
with Theory of Unemployment (1933), but not so when concerned with IF. It is safe to say
monetary policy is the most important subject in the latter volume. Pigou raises an issue that
until at least the middle of the 1920s the Bank of England had been aiming at stabilizing its
gold reserve rather than the general prices in Britain; and proposes that it take on the latter
goal proactively.
Pigou calls the conventional policy the Bank of England had been employing \reserve dis-
count policy"; and characterizes it as follows (Pigou, 1927a, 278{9). First, this policy tries to
keep the proportion of the gold reserve to its liabilities (i.e. money supply) above a certain
level in order to secure against any danger of default. Second, In times of good business condi-
tion where the danger of default is remote, \people are ready to pay higher interest on a given
volume of loans"; and under this circumstance the Bank maximizes the pro¯t by reducing the
proportion of reserve down to the acceptable minimum. The reason why the Central Bank
makes it a principle to maximize pro¯t is to use this pro¯t as a resource to augment the gold
reserve. Thus in times of rising prices the rate of interest will be raised, not to restrict the rise
in prices, but to take advantage of the opportunities for pro¯t. The manipulation of interest
rate, as a result, is likely to lag behind the price movement under the \reserve discount policy".
Pigou proposes to substitute for \reserve discount policy" \stabilising discount policy" aim-
ing at stabilizing general prices. Yet he notices two di±culties involved in this shift of policies.
On the one hand, there needs to exist some discretion for the Central Bank to inspect and
interpret various statistics. To e®ectively restrict the price °uctuations, it has to devise a
policy in an earlier stage than it is possible to spot the realized price changes and to respond
mechanically to them. Because \the seeds of expansions and contractions", he says, \are sown
some little while before the movements in [bank] credit [, which tends to precede the price
movements] occur, and it is the sowing of the seeds, and not their sprouting, if they have
been sown, that discount policy is chie°y able to in°uence" (Pigou, 1927a, 283). Thus, when
making decisions on monetary policy, the Central Bank, instead of responding to the realized
movements of prices or bank credit, needs to interpret the movements of such \forecasters",
or leading indicators, as \prices of speculative securities", \the volume of new orders given
per month in important industries, or in the stocks of ¯nished goods in dealers' hands", or
\the percentage of workpeople out of employment" (Pigou, 1927a, 284{5).7 Yet in the con-
temporary policy debate there existed a general distaste for permitting to the Central Bank
discretion because it might involve \stupidity and perversity on the part of governing persons"
(Pigou, 1927a, 295). Pigou, though paying attention to this, is in favor of stabilizing policy
on the whole.8
The second di±culty with the shift from \reserve discount policy" to \stabilising discount
policy" consists in the latter's discrepancy with the current international monetary system, the
7 According to Eshag (1963, 136n99), monetary policy based on leading indicators had been already
advocated by such Cambridge economists as Hawtrey, Keynes, and Lavington before the publication of
IF (1927). But in 1924 in the article called \Correctives of the Trade Cycle" Pigou proposed the same
method (Pigou, 1924, 115{6). It might not be wrong, therefore, to say that Pigou started to recognize
the importance of the monetary policy based on leading indicators at about the same time as they did.
8 Pigou writes, \since the restoration of the gold standard, the Bank of England have recently, it would
seem, adopted in some considerable degree, a policy directed towards price stabilisation" (Pigou, 1927a,
278n2). This seems to imply that the general distaste for the discretion was gradually waning around
this time.
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gold standard. The gold standard, though making for the ¯xed exchange rate, makes a country
on it vulnerable to the disturbances from a international gold market. If the international gold
market is stable to some extent, the Central Bank can refuse to have its policy a®ected by
moderate in°uxes into or e²uxes out of its reserve. But it doesn't always stay stable. In
the following quote Pigou anticipates the situation where, facing the great disturbances in
the international gold market, Britain was forced to abandon the gold standard several years
later. If the value of gold strongly trends upward for a long time,
[t]he Central Bank, to prevent prices [in the domestic economy] from falling, must reduce
its discount rate and create more and more credits on the basis of a steadily diminishing
gold reserve. Obviously it cannot carry on this policy for long: if it presses it too far,
it may ¯nd itself without su±cient legal tender to meet its customers' cheques, and
collapse in ignonimity. (Pigou, 1927a, 305)
That is to say, in such a condition the Central Bank has to pursue the two contradictory
goals, that is, (1) to enlarge the money supply in order to prop up the domestic economy,
and (2) to maintain the proportion of the gold reserve in order to preserve con¯dence in the
currency. This is why Pigou declares as follows: \If a stabilising discount policy is adopted in a
wholehearted manner, the logical sequel as regards currency is [not] the gold standard plan . .
. It is a[n inconvertible] paper currency" (Pigou, 1927a, 296). He ¯nds it possible to stabilize
the gold market for the time being by such international coordination as contemplated in
the resolutions of the Genoa Conference of 1922. Yet he doesn't have complete faith in this
method. Pigou suggests that there will come up the situation which will require a national
decision on international monetary system. \To make a choice between that policy [i.e. the
maintenance of the gold standard helped by international coordination] and the other various
policies that are open to us is a task that cannot be attempted in a work of this kind. Economic
analysis can provide data for statesmen; but the attitude of public opinion and the current
political and diplomatic situation are dominant factors in determining what, on the whole,
it is best to do" (Pigou, 1927a, 305). This quote can be safely interpreted as proposing the
introduction of an inconvertible paper currency should the \political and diplomatic situation"
allow, since \economic analysis" clearly suggests what is best; and since Pigou supposes the
possible restrictive measures against overissue of currency after the assumed departure from
the gold standard.9
What has been shown suggests that Pigou's attitude towards monetary policy was closely in
touch with realities of those days. He, though somewhat hesitating the drastic shift in view of
the rigid nature of the general opinion, preferred forward-looking policy aimed at stabilizing
a domestic economy to the mechanical \fool-proof" method of maintaining the gold reserve.
Even the depart from the gold standard was on the agenda of his discussion. Pigou guesses the
quantitative impact and says that \if a policy of price stabilisation were successfully carried
through, the amplitude of industrial °uctuations would be substantially reduced|it might be
cut down to half of what it is at present" (Pigou, 1927a, 219, my emphasis).
9 Pigou was one of the signatories to the Cunli®e Report (1918) and the Bradbury Report (1924), both of
which recommended the restoration of the gold standard on the prewar parity. Yet, according to Winch
(1969, 154), in 1930 in his testimony before the Macmillan Committee Pigou looked back at the situation
and said no other policies could not be accepted by the general public. There he mentioned, \I was a
stabiliser long before [serving at the Cunli®e Committee]"(ibid.).
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3.2 Public works
Pigou also take note of the following defect of monetary policy. In times of serious depression
when borrowers anticipate unacceptably low pro¯t from any investment \[p]eople do not want
to borrow on any terms, and the banks cannot force them to do so" (Pigou, 1927a, 267). Then
monetary policy is not valid unless the negative rate of interest is possible. In IF Pigou fails
to provide any way out; and says instead that monetary policy is e®ective to restrict booms
so that it is just as e®ective to restrict slumps, which Pigou assumes are resulted from the
burst of booms.
In his later work, Theory of Unemployment (1933) Pigou, assuming the same framework
as in IF, brie°y discusses the measure e®ective even to the serious depression. Here Pigou
introduces the new concept of \proper rate of interest" (Pigou, 1933b, 213) that should be the
rate under the \stabilising discount policy", or that should stabilize the general prices. And
he says,
[i]t is, indeed, always possible for the Central Bank, by open market operations, to
force out money into balances held by the public. But in times of deep depression,
when industrialists see no hope anywhere, there may be no positive rate of money
interest that will avail to get this money used. The proper money rate . . . may, in
short, be a negative rate, and, therefore, one which it is impossible to introduce. In
these circumstances attempts to uphold the standard monetary system [i.e. stabilising
discount policy in IF ], so long as reliance is placed on purely monetary defences, are
bound to fail. If, however, at the same time that the banking system keeps money cheap
the Government adopts a policy of public works, the risk of failure is greatly reduced.
For this policy, providing, as it does, new openings for real investment, pushes up the
proper rate of bank interest above what it would otherwise have been. Thus it may
turn a negative proper rate, to which it is impossible for any actual rate to conform,
into a positive one. (ibid.)
Here we notice that Pigou considered the public works as a complementary measure to mon-
etary policy.
Through what channel Pigou thinks the public works would a®ect the \proper rate of
interest"? The public works normally involve the following two actions: (1) increasing bank
credit more than the private sector alone attains, and (2) putting into use the money thus
borrowed. To explain this with the exchange equation Pigou uses in Theory of Unemployment,
Mv = I (M means the total money stock, v the income velocity, I money income), the former
action is represented by the increase in M , the latter by the increase in v. Pigou places more
importance on the movement of v than ofM . The reason is that, sinceM includes the hoarded
money that is not put into the \income-expenditure circuit", the increase inM realized by the
increase in new bank credit doesn't always lead to the increase in money income, but might
only lead to the increase in the hoarding, which is represented by the decrease in v (Pigou,
1933b, 197). For Pigou the public works consist in the only e®ective measure to raise the
money income in the times of serious depression.10
10 Pigou mentions elsewhere there is another situation where monetary policy is ine®ective so that public
works are the only e®ective measure. If a country is on the gold standard and the international market
is unstable, the cut of a domestic interest rate might incur a serious e²ux of gold (Pigou, 1929, 186).
In such a circumstance public works is the only e®ective measure against unemployment. According to
Howson (1985, 165) Keynes also makes the same point.
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Obviously this assertion of Pigou's that in times of depression income velocity is more
important than money stock is directed at R. Hawtrey. Hawtrey, one of the contributors to the
so-called \Treasury View", insisting the invalidness of public works,11 was a authority ¯gure
in monetary theory, arguing public works are relevant only insofar as they augment money
stock (Hawtrey, 1928, 112). Hawtrey, assuming that there is negligible amount of hoarded
money in reality so that changes in income velocity v are rare and insigni¯cant, considered the
money stock M to be the all-important element. For him public works was \merely a piece
of ritual, convenient to people who want to be able to say that they are doing something, but
otherwise irrelevant" (ibid.). Hawtrey had no doubt, on the other hand, that the increase in
money supply by monetary policy could in any circumstance overcome unemployment. It was
this view of Hawtrey's that Pigou implicitly criticized with the argument above.12
Pigou estimates the e®ect of the price stabilization to be fairly large (\half of what [the
amplitude of industrial °uctuations] is at present") as noted above. Here we've shown that
for Pigou public works are the integral part of price stabilization policy; and so we cannot
doubt that he recognizes public works as an important remedy against unemployment. What
he criticizes was the so-called \Treasury View" and its contributor, Hawtrey. There is nothing
for Keynes to accuse Pigou of in this ¯eld.
3.3 Wage adjustment
The next measure to come under examination in IF is wage adjustment. Yet Pigou considers
this measure to be of less importance than such measures as noted above.
Pigou had had since the earliest book, Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace (1905)
practical views that °exibility of wage adjustment would depend on the states of the relations
between employers and employees; and that the states of the relations would depend on the
e®ectiveness of the machinery for negotiation. Thus for Pigou the relations between employers
and employees are not a given factor, but one to be improved. These views are maintained in
IF.
Machinery for collective bargaining may be set up, and, partly as cause, partly as e®ect
of this, a spirit of goodwill and accommodation may be engendered. In representative
meetings of employers and employed not only mechanical indices of prices and so on,
but al considerations relevant to wages, may be periodically reviewed in a whole-hearted
e®ort to secure a reasonable settlement. Where arrangements of this kind exist each side
will be ready to make concessions if the conditions seem to call for them, con¯dent that
the other side, in converse circumstances, will do likewise. Wage-rates will be rendered
less rigid, the amplitude of industrial °uctuations associated with given variations in
demand will be pro tanto reduced, and economic welfare correspondingly augmented.
Here Pigou makes it clear that wage adjustment should be improved through the betterment
of the relations between employers and employees: the government could not directly play a
11 According to Clarke (1988, ch. 3), the \Treasury View" was a counterargument which the Conservative
Chancellor of Exchequer W. Churchill ordered to compose against the expansion policies advocated by
the Liberal Party in the 1929 election. This view was stated in the Budget speech in April 1929, and
published as a White Paper in the following month. Although Hawtrey stayed in Harvard in 1928{9 so
that he could not be involved in the formulation of the Treasury View in the ¯nal stage, he was counted
on as being \the one man who ought to know whether Keynes was talking nonsense.
12 The settlement of this dispute would require the actual amount of the hoarded money. Hawtrey also,
assuming its insigni¯cance, questioned the theory of liquidity preference in Keynes's General Theory.
See Laidler (1999, ch. 11).
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role in this process.
In addition, Pigou doesn't consider, it should be noticed, wage adjustment to be quantita-
tively important. His guess on the e®ect of improvement of wage adjustment is \one-eighth
[of what the amplitude of °uctuations is at present]" (Pigou, 1927a, 225), which is much less
than the e®ect of price stabilization (half).
That Pigou had never called for the wage cut as a practical policy of government is made
clear further by the following quotes. In the preface in Lapses from Full Employment (1945),
the volume recasted for the general reader, he says, \Professor Dennis Robertson, who has
very kindly read my proofs, has warned me that the form of the book may suggest that I
am in favour of attacking the problem of unemployment by manipulating wages rather than
by manipulating demand. I wish, therefore, to say clearly that this is not so." (Pigou, 1945,
v). The similar remark is found in Theory of Unemployment : \[this book's] aim is to clarify
thought, not to advocate a policy" (Pigou, 1933b, v). Then what was his policy at the time
of the publication of Theory of Unemployment in 1933? It is expressly stated in his article in
the Times in the same year.
For prosperity to be restored either money costs must fall or money prices must rise.
The practical di±culties in the way of the former solution have proved so serious and
the friction to be overcome so great that the main body of instructed opinion has turned
towards the latter. (Pigou, 1933a, 13)
Pigou goes on to recommend the cheap money policy so as to raise general prices.
4 Wage rigidity in the 1920s
It is now evident that Pigou places much more importance on price stabilization than on
wage adjustment in IF. Nevertheless, Pigou brings up the apparently opposing view in the
article called \Wage Policy and Unemployment" published in the same year as IF (1927),
to the e®ect that the failure of wage adjustment causes a great deal of unemployment. As
Laidler (1999, 159{60) notices,13 Pigou asserted that after World War I the factors particular
in this period had caused wage adjustment between employers and employees to be more rigid
than before the war, the result of which was mass unemployment (¯g. 1 shows the movement
of unemployment in 1850{1926). Those factors consist in, Pigou identi¯es, (1) a couple of
institutional changes in a labor market, and (2) structural disparities between two groups of
industries.14
First, there were two following major institutional changes in the labor market after World
War I: (1) \direct State action" and (2) the \development of unemployment insurance" (Pigou,
1927b, 355). The ¯rst of these, \direct state action", as speci¯ed in Theory of Unemployment
(Pigou, 1933b, 255), refers to the minimum wage regulation. In Britain the minimum wage
legislation (Trade Boards Act) was so amended as to enlarge the range of covered occupations
in 1918. Pigou, in 1922, treated the amendment of the Act critically, warning that it would
create the tendency for the wage rates of covered workers to stay higher than the competi-
tive levels. Second, the development of public unemployment insurance, Pigou believes, has
promoted higher wages by solidify employees' bargaining position. Before the war, since the
trade unions paid for their bene¯ts to the unemployed unionists out of their own funds, \heavy
unemployment means a heavy drain on union funds" (Pigou, 1933b, 254). This situation had
13 Aslanbeigui (1992, 422) brie°y mentions this.
14 In many other places Pigou relates mass unemployment in the 1920s to the post-war wage rigidity (Pigou
1933, 252{6; 1941, 93; 1945, 73; 1947, Pt. 2; 1952, 1003).
9
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 16
 1850  1860  1870  1880  1890  1900  1910  1920  1930
unemployment by year
Fig. 1
brought about a proactive restraint on the side of trade unions before the war. After the war,
however, when the public unemployment insurance was expanded to almost all the occupa-
tions, and when \unemployed members are cared for, in the main, at the expense of other
people, the union's contribution being no larger when there are many unemployed than when
there are few, this check does not operate" (ibid.). By these two social legislations, Pigou
asserts, \wage-rates have, over a wide area, been set at a level which is too high [to realize
full employment]" (Pigou, 1927b, 355). Yet Pigou has no intention to call for the abolition
or the cutback of these legislations, which suggests that as regards these social legislations he
attaches more weight to their merit of helping the ill-situated people than to their demerit of
promoting higher wages.
The second factor in promoting wage rigidity in the 1920s that Pigou points to is, as de-
tailed in Aspects of British Economic History (1947),15 the structural disparity between two
groups of industries, namely the depressed export-related industries, \unsheltered industries"
and the better-o® industries catering to the domestic market, \unsheltered industries". In the
real terms the British exports in 1923 was around 80 per cent of what was in 1913. Pigou
attributes this fact to several causes, one of which is that, particularly in the textile industries,
new manufacturing countries such as Japan and India developed not only at home but in other
countries, ¯rst, because they had been shut o® from the supply of the European countries dur-
ing the war and, second, because the agricultural countries, faced with the fall of prices of
their produce after the war, had to be content with cheaper products from these countries.
The unfavorable situation in the export industries also deteriorated dock and river transport
industries. Meanwhile the industries for the domestic market, being \sheltered" from such
¯erce competition as the export industries had to bear with, enjoyed the relative prosperity.
Pigou thinks that the structural disparity, aggravated with slow labor movement, was, though
itself the much-noticed cause for unemployment, a factor in promoting rigidity of the average
15 The fact that this volume was written in the 1940s might stir up the doubt that Pigou did not notice
the factor in promoting wage rigidity due to the structural disparity in earlier period. But according to
Howson and Winch (1977, 64) Pigou mentioned it at the Economic Advisory Council in 1930.
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rate of wages in the economy as a whole. For, \it is di±cult to see", he writes, \ how, in
industries that were themselves prosperous, work-people could have been brought to accept
wage reductions" (Pigou, 1947, 55). Thus his point here is that since the labor market was
divided between these two di®erently-situated groups of industries, in the economy as a whole
the average rate of wages had become insensitive even to the large increase in the aggregate
amount of unemployment. Under this circumstance forced transference of labor from the de-
pressed industries to the relatively prosperous industries could make an ameliorative measure.
Pigou gives a cursory treatment to this measure in Theory of Unemployment (Pigou, 1933b,
283). Yet this treatment doesn't include discussion on the feasibility or the possible rami¯-
cations of this measure, not to mention that he clearly state the disadvantage outweighing
the advantage in his later Lapses from Full Employment (1945), saying \[u]nemployment is
always an evil, but sometimes to reduce it might entail worse evils" (Pigou, 1945, 68).
Thus Pigou considers these two factors to cause wage rigidity after World War I. In fact,
leaving aside the violent °uctuations immediately after the war, in spite of the fact that in the
twenties the general prices fell around 10 per cent and the rate of unemployment almost always
remained above 10 per cent, the money rate of wages remained unchanged over this period
(Mitchell 1962, 345; Clarke 1996, ch. 4).16 For Pigou, who has faith in the e®ectiveness of the
collective bargainings (see 3.3 above), this situation must have been surprising. He assumes
that \at least 5 per cent. of extra unemployment" (Pigou, 1927b, 356) be attributed to the
wage rigidity particular to the post-war economy. The quantitative estimate of 5 per cent,
however, seems to contradict Pigou's own system in IF, which has been examined in section
3 above. He has placed much more weight on price stabilization than on wage adjustment in
IF. Why does he identify the worsening of wage adjustment alone as a factor responsible for
the substantial part of the increase in unemployment in the twenties? Why doesn't he identify
the heavy price fall as a more powerful factor, so that his diagnosis could be consistent with
the system of IF? The answer I suggest is that in the late twenties he didn't have an option
to deal with the abrogation of the gold standard as a practical policy, so that he had to
content himself with identifying the factor other than the price fall the gold standard forced
on Britain. Before taking on this problem let us discuss the direct cause for the abrupt rise
in unemployment in the early 1920s.
Pigou says the following in \Wage Policy and Unemployment", the article which ¯rst points
to the problem of wage rigidity in 1927. \It is a matter of common knowledge that the great
slump of 1920{1 had its origin in causes lying altogether outside wages, and was intimately
associated, whether, as some hold, as the direct e®ect of a deliberate policy of monetary
de°ation, or, as others contend, as a joint consequence of the bursting of a gigantic bubble of
unwarranted optimism, with a heavy fall in prices" (Pigou, 1927b, 358{9). He acknowledges
here that the upsurge in unemployment in 1920{1 was spurred, if not initiated, by the purely
monetary factor. Then why was \a deliberate policy of monetary de°ation" taken? That is
because the government wholeheartedly committed to the restoration of the gold standard at
that time. Pigou depicts this situation at some length in Aspects of British Economic History,
1918{1925 (1947).
First let us look at the movement of unemployment in this period. By means of the statistics
adjusted with the estimate of 1918{19 by Pigou (¯g. 2), we can see how Pigou divides this
period into four parts. First, what Pigou calls the \Breathing Space" consists in the short
period between the Armistice and April 1919, when the unemployment rose. Second, the
reconstruction boom persisted just one year from April 1919 to April 1920, during which the
16 According to Howson and Winch (1977, 59{60), L. Robbins and H. Henderson, too, pointed to the wage
rigidity at the Economic Advisory Council in 1930.
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statistics show unemployment fell. Third, the rather prolonged slump, which started from
April 1920, is characterized with the unprecedented upsurge in unemployment. In June 1921
the rate of unemployment, aggravated further by the great strike in the coalmine, went beyond
the mark of 20 per cent. The great slump, Pigou asserts, continued around two years and a
half till the end of 1922. Fourth and lastly, the downward momentum ran out of steam in
the end of 1922, leaving the economy in stagnancy. This stagnant state of economy, Pigou
supposes, extended beyond the period under discussion and lasted till \the Wall Street crash
of 1929 heralded a second and greater Slump" (Pigou, 1947, 7).
Why did the slump starting from April 1920 build such momentum? Pigou's answer is
bifurcated into (1) the real and (2) the monetary causes. The real causes he points to includes
(1) the fall of aggregate demand as the restoration demand quieted down, and (2) the depressed
export of Britain, which has been discussed above. By virtue of these real causes the aggregate
demand for labor would have to be somewhat contracted after the restoration boom. More
essential in spurring the slump, however, were the monetary causes.
Pigou, who has criticized Hawtrey for his excessive reliance on the monetary phenomena
and for assuming the invalidity of public works as discussed in 3.2, in Aspects of British
Economic History criticizes him and emphasizes that purely monetary causes alone cannot
directly turn the business °uctuation. Nevertheless he acknowleges that monetary causes are
capable of accelerating the °uctuations much further than real causes alone are capable. He
depicts the process through which the government at that time threw the economy into chaos
by committing to the restoration of the pre-war parity, the \sacrosanct" $1 = $4:86 (Pigou,
1947, 145{51).17 After World War I it did not seem within the range of practicable policy
for Britain to ¯x the exchange rate to the pre-war parity because of the relative rise in the
prices in Britain relative to those in the United States. Consequently the British government
o±cially prohibited the gold export, which had been refrained from voluntarily during the war.
When the restoration boom came soon, the Bank of England, now relieved from the duty of
17 (Garside, 1990, ch. 5) laid out the almost parallel explanation on the monetary circumstances in post-war
Britain.
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maintaining the gold reserve, failed to swiftly respond to the price rise, resulting in the intense
price rise in the Boom year by around 40 per cent. After the turn of business °uctuation
in April 1920 there was in turn the sharp decline of prices. Yet the Bank of England didn't
respond to the price fall. This second inaction of it was not a mistake, but a deliberate policy
with the aim which must be pursued even at the cost of the short-run stabilization.
Though in March 1919 the British Government deliberately broke that link, it only
did so with the ¯rm intention of forging it again in the near future. Its avowed policy
was to re-establish our country on a gold basis at the pre-war parity as soon as that
should prove practicable. This policy, which at the time was endorsed by nearly all
persons of authority, dominated the outlook of the Treasury and the Bank of England
over the whole of our period, until in April 1925 it was ¯nally carried into e®ect. . .
. A necessary preliminary to the restoration of the Gold Standard was to bring the
exchange back to the neighbourhood of par. When it began to run away, measures had
to be taken to arrest it; when it tended to stand still, further measures to improve it.
These measures took the form of operations on the discount rate and Bank dealings in
securities aimed at reducing the English, relatively to the American, price level. (Pigou,
1947, 148)
There were two reasons why Britain had to accept the extensive fall of prices. First the
price rise in the Boom year in Britain was also large relatively to the price movement in the
United States, leading to the depreciation of the sterling by 16 per cent in that year, that
is, from $4.65 to $3.91 to the pound. Thus in April 1920 the aimed parity was substantially
far from the current rate of exchange and the signi¯cant relative fall in the British prices
would be needed. Second, around the same time as the downturn of the British economy the
United States economy also saw its downturn. Yet in the United States the newly-formed
Federal Reserve system failed to e®ectively act in response, Pigou asserts, because it had not
realized the cumulative e®ect of de°ation and the working of the interest rate (Pigou, 1947,
196).18 Thus, in spite of the price fall, the rate of interest had not been lowered in the United
States for a year, neither had it been in Britain, which had to reduce its prices ahead of the
United States. As a result the British prices fell sharply, yet with the bene¯t of which the
sterling came back nearly to the prewar parity against the dollar by the end of 1922. The
exchange rate being more or less stable from that point of time, the rate of interest was kept
low. In July 1924, when \the goal of a restored Gold Standard was in sight" (Pigou, 1947,
151), however, the Bank of England take the tightening measure to slightly raise the market
rate of interest. In the same month the rate of unemployment turned upward. To sum up,
the British government, while attaining the original goal of restoring the gold standard, by
the same process gave birth to the violent movement of prices and put its economy into the
tremendous disorder.
Thus Pigou realizes that what enlarged the unemployment, aside from initiating the turn,
in the post-war period was the purely monetary cause of the sharp de°ation. Therefore, it
was the unemployment thus enlarged before the restoration of the gold standard that, Pigou
emphasized in the 1927 article, the wage rigidity prevented from declining at all. As is clear
from what has been seen, however, the cause for the enlargement of unemployment was by
no means unrelated to the gold standard; on the contrary it was the deliberate credit crunch
by the government in order to restore the gold standard. The pressure of de°ation persisted,
18 According to Wheelock (1991, 14{17), the Federal Reserve system was formed just before World War I.
Although it came to play an active role in stabilizing the economy with the use of open market operation
from around 1923, it did not until then.
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of course, after the restoration in 1925. Through the latter half of the 1920s, according to
(Clarke, 1996, ch. 4), the Bank rate was held around 5 per cent; the wholesale prices declined
by 17 per cent, and the cost of living by 6 per cent.Nonetheless, \few had the nerve", writes
one historian, \even to consider voluntarily breaking with gold" (Garside, 1990, 132). Winch
(1969, 137{8), too, notes that in the Macmillan Committee no one including Keynes, except
Ernest Bevin, stood up for abandonment of the gold standard. The reason why they objected
the abandonment was that \the earnings of the City depended on international monetary
stability; and that the export trade was likely to be damaged by °uctuating exchanges" (ibid.).
In addition the gold standard on the prewar parity seems to have had the symbolic signi¯cance
among the major industrialized countries that each of them restrict itself from the competitive
depreciation of currency. Let us recollect the quote from Pigou's IF : \Economic analysis can
provide data for statesmen; butthe attitude of public opinion and the current political and
diplomatic situation are dominant factors in determining what, on the whole, it is best to do
[as regards the international monetary system]" (Pigou, 1927a, 305). His economic analysis
with the domestic stability has clearly suggested that it be the best to abandon the gold
standard and restrict the price fall. This view of his wasn't made less important so much as
more important and more urgent by the realization of the problem of wage rigidity particular
to the postwar economy.19
It was not a coincidence that Pigou argued for the cheap money policy in 1933 when Britain
had gotten o® the gold standard. Pigou, as mentioned above, laid out the policy advice
in Times in 1933. There he proposes such monetary expansion measures as a reduction in
the rate of interest and sinking fund payments; and he praises the conversion in 1932 of the
War Loan into lower rate for having \brought home to the minds of lenders the fact that
the day of high rates of interest on long-term loans has passed" (Pigou, 1933a, 14). These
measures had been impossible to apply under the ¯xed exchange rate of the gold standard.
That said, these expansion measure still had substantial risks: chances were that they would
cause destabilization in the currency market, which might lead to the sudden depreciation of
the sterling and the capital °ight from Britain. Pigou acknowledges, therefore, that it would
be the better policy to postpone the decisive action until she could enlist the coordination
from the United States. Despite these risks Britain, he maintains, have to do something by
herself under the situation in which unemployment exceeded three million.20 Thus Pigou's
advocacy for the monetary expansion should be seen as pleading that the British government
take advantage of the policy discretion enlarged by the withdrawal from the gold standard.
5 Conclusion
We have seen Pigou's analysis of unemployment from the viewpoint of its relation to his
theory of industrial °uctuations. In his system on industrial °uctuations Pigou divides the
causes of business °uctuations under the following three headings: (1) real, (2) psychological,
19 Pigou supported the restoration of the gold standard at the Cunli®e Committee in 1918 and the
Chamberlain-Bradbury Committee in 1924. Probably at that point of time he counted on the e®ect
of wage adjustment. According to his own estimate of the elasticity of aggregate demand for labor with
regard to money wages in Theory of Unemployment (1933), to reduce 5 per cent of unemployment would
require 3.33 per cent of wage reduction. There seems to have existed, according to Mitchell (1962, 344),
the decline of wages of such order.
20 Britain maintained the historically low level of Bank rate from 1932 through the thirties. In the meantime
the rate of unemployment, though always above 10 per cent, crawled back from extremely high level of
1931 to the pre-1929 level; the aggregate production rose by 45 per cent. Cf. Cairncross (1995, 65) and
Garside (1990, 134{9).
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and (3) monetary causes. These three kinds of causes, he asserts, a®ect one another to initiate
and cumulatively strengthen the pressure of either direction. Among the possible remedies
what intrigues Pigou most is the price stabilization and the monetary policy as an e®ective
measure to realize it; he, on the other hand, placed much less emphasis on wage adjustment.
When dealing with the economy after World War I, Pigou adds to the system of business
°uctuation a new element, that is, the problem of wage rigidity. Before the war the slow but
steady wage adjustment was forthcoming when unemployment rose; but after the war, despite
the existence of mass unemployment, the average rate of wage was held rigid as the statistics
actually show. Pigou ascribes this change to the following facts: (1) that the expansion of
state unemployment insurance after the war, he believes, had changed the balance of bargain-
ing positions between employers and unions, and (2) that the structural di®erential between
industries which prevailed after the war prevented the average rate of wage from declining.
Though it was quite natural for a contemporary economist to point to this new phenomenon of
wage rigidity, it requires some explanation that Pigou didn't pay attention to the substantial
fall in prices in the same period.
In Britain in the twenties under the gold standard, the rate of interest had to be held high
in order to attract the short-term foreign deposits in Britain so she can maintain the prewar
rate of exchange; and this consisted in the pressure of de°ation in the period. As regards
the gold standard Pigou in his Industrial Fluctuations (1927) was concerned with its possible
con°ict with the domestic stabilization; he, in the meantime, avoided an unambiguous policy
proposal because of the actual complexities involving the gold standard such as the con¯dence
in currency. As shown by this cautious attitude of Pigou's, the gold standard seemed to be
unchallengeable to the contemporaries. Putting these together we can safely say that for
Pigou the wage rigidity in postwar Britain had a signi¯cance in suggesting that, aside from
the large-scale public works which political circumstances would not permit, the only e®ective
measure against unemployment, namely wage adjustment, would no longer be counted on.
When Britain depreciated her currency in 1931, the situations had changed; and in 1933 Pigou
proposed that she take advantage of these situations and continue to apply credit expansion
policy. From what has been said we can conclude that Pigou consistently recognizes the
importance of price stabilization and, as an e®ective measure, of monetary policy for the sake
of minimizing the amplitude of industrial °uctuations and predicaments of workers due to
them.
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